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ECON3152/4453/8053 Tutorial 1
发布时间:2022-08-25
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ECON3152/4453/8053 Tutorial 1
2022
1. Find all the Nash equilibria of Battle of sexes:
|
Soccer |
Opera |
Soccor |
2,3 |
0,0 |
Opera |
0,0 |
3,2 |
2. Find all the Nash equilibria of the following game:
|
Rock |
Paper |
Scissor |
Rock |
0,0 |
-5,5 |
10,-10 |
Paper |
5,-5 |
0,0 |
-2,2 |
Scissor |
-10,10 |
2,-2 |
0,0 |
3. (Cournot competition) There are n firms choosing output simulataneously: the output by Firm i is qi ≥ 0. The market price for their product is p = A − ∑ qi . Firm i’s profit is ui (qi , q −i ) = (A − ∑j(n)=1 qj ) qi . Find all the Nash equilibria in pure strategy.
4. (Hotelling’s model) There are two firms, 1 and 2, and unit mass of consumers uniformly distributed on the interval [0, 1], each with a unit demand. The firms sell similar products and choose their unit prices p1 and p2 simultaneously. For a consumer θ ∈ [0, 1], buying from Firm 1 yields payoff A − tθ − p1 and buying from Firm 2 yields payoff A − t(1 − θ) − p2 , where A is a sufficiently big positive number so that not buying is not an attractive option for any consumer, and t > 0. The classical interpretation is that Firms 1 and 2 are located at the two sides of a town, θ is the location of the consumer and t is unit transportation cost. The more useful interpretation is that the two firms produce products of different styles, θ is a consumer’s taste, and t measure how important the styles and tastes are. Find all the Nash equilibria in pure strategy.