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Managerial Economics Technical Questions
发布时间:2023-01-19
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Managerial Economics
Technical Questions
Question 1:
Suppose that two identical firms produce Smartphones and that they are the only firms in the market. Their costs are given by C1 = 60q1 and C2=60q2, where q1 is the output of Firm 1 and q2 the output of Firm 2. Price is determined by the following demand curve: Q = 300-P, where Q = q1 + q2 .
a) Suppose, as in the Cournot equilibrium, that each firm chooses its profit-maximizing level of output on the assumption that its competitor’s output is fixed. Find each firm’s “reaction function” – the rule that gives its desired output in terms of its competitor’s output. Carefully interpret each firm’s reaction function.
b) Calculate the Cournot equilibrium output of each firm – the values of q1 and q2 for which both firms are doing as well as they can, given their competitor’s output. Carefully explain the assumptions on which you have relied to derive the equilibrium quantities.
c) What are the resulting market price and profit of each firm?
d) Calculate each firm’s profit if the two firms could coordinate their decisions to act like a monopoly
Question 2:
During 1980, most of the world's supply of lysine was produced by a Japanese company named Ajinomoto. Lysine is essential amino acid that is an important livestock feed component. At this time, the United States imported most of the world supply of Lysine - more than 30,000 tons - to use in livestock feed at a price of $1.65 per pound. The worldwide market for lysine fundamentally changed in 1991 when U.S-based Archer Daniels Midland (ADM) began producing lysine - a move that doubled worldwide production capacity.
Experts conjectured that Ajinomoto and ADM had similar cost structures and that the marginal cost of producing and distributing lysine was approximately $0.70 per pound. Shortly after ADM began producing lysine, the worldwide price dropped to $0.70. However, by 1993 the price of lysine shot back up to $1.65. The demand facing the industry was thought to be Q = 208 - 80P (in millions of pounds).
How do analyze the evolution of prices in this market? Support your answer with appropriate calculations.
Question 3:
You are the manager of BS computers, which competes with CD Computers to sell high-powered computers to businesses. The two products are indistinguishable. The large investment required to build production facilities prohibits other firms from entering this market. The inverse market demand for computers is P = 5,100 – 0.5Q and both firms produce at a marginal cost of £750 per computer.
i) Suppose, as in the Cournot equilibrium, that each firm chooses its profit- maximizing level of output on the assumption that its competitor’s output is fixed. Find each firm’s “reaction function” – the rule that gives its desired output in terms of its competitor’s output.
ii) Calculate the Cournot equilibrium output of each firm – the values of q1 and q2 for which both firms are doing as well as they can, given their competitor’s output. What are the resulting market price and profits of each firm?
The engineering department at BS has been working on developing an assembly method that would reduce the marginal cost of producing these high-powered computers and has found a process that allows it to manufacture each computer at a marginal cost of £500.
iii) How will this technological advance impact BS’ equilibrium output and profit?
Question 4:
Coca-Cola recently announced that it is developing a “smart” vending machine. Such machines are able to change prices according to the outside temperature.
Suppose for the purpose of this problem that the temperature can be either “High” or “Low.” On days of “High” temperature, demand is given by Q = 280 – 2P, where Q is number of cans of Coke sold during the day and P is the price per can measured in pence. On days of “Low” temperature, demand is only Q = 160 – 2P. There are an equal number of days with “High” and “Low” temperature. The marginal cost of a can of Coke is 20 pence.
Suppose that Coca-Cola indeed installs a “smart” vending machine, and is able to charge different prices for Coke on “Hot” and “Cold” days. What price should Coca- Cola charge on a “Hot” day? What price should Coca-Cola charge on a “Cold” day?
Alternatively, suppose that Coca-Cola continues to use its normal vending machines, which must be programmed with a fixed price, independent of the weather. What is the optimal price for a can of Coke?
What are Coca-Cola’s profits under constant and weather-variable prices? How much would Coca-Cola be willing to pay to enable its vending machine to vary prices with the weather, i.e., to have a “smart” vending machine?
Question 5:
Ben & Jerry’s recently announced that it is developing a “smart” vending machine. Such machines are able to change prices according to the outside temperature.
Suppose for the purpose of this problem that the temperature can be either “High” or “Low.” On days of “High” temperature, demand is given by Q = 420 – 2P, where Q is number of Chocolate Fudge Brownie ice cream mini tubs sold during the day and P is the price per mini tub of chocolate fudge brownie ice cream measured in pence. On days of “Low” temperature, demand is only Q = 240 – 2P. There are an equal number of days with “High” and “Low” temperature. The marginal cost of a mini tub of chocolate fudge brownie ice cream is 30 pence.
a) Suppose that Ben & Jerry’s indeed installs a “smart” vending machine, and is able to charge different prices for chocolate fudge brownie ice creams on “Hot” and “Cold” days. What price should Ben & Jerry’s charge on a “Hot” day? What price should Ben & Jerry’s charge on a “Cold” day?
b) Alternatively, suppose that Ben & Jerry’s continues to use its normal vending machines, which must be programmed with a fixed price, independent of the weather. What is the optimal price for a mini tub of chocolate fudge brownie ice cream?
c) What are profits of Ben & Jerry’s under constant and weather-variable prices? How much would Ben & Jerry’s be willing to pay to enable its vending machine to vary prices with the weather, i.e., to have a “smart” vending machine?
Question 6:
Two firms are engaged in Bertrand competition. There are 10,000 people in the population, each of whom is willing to pay at most 10 for at most one unit of the good. Both firms have a constant marginal cost of 5. Currently, each firm is allocated half the market. It costs a customer s to switch from one firm to the other. Customers know what prices are being charged. Law or custom restricts the firms to charging whole-dollar amounts (e.g., they can charge 6, but not 6.50).
a) Suppose that s = 0. What are the Nash equilibria of this model? Why does discrete (whole-dollar) pricing result in more equilibria than continuous pricing?
b) Suppose that s = 2. What is (are) the Nash equilibrium (equilibria) of this model?
c) Suppose that s = 4. What is (are) the Nash equilibrium (equilibria) of this model?
d) Comparing the expected profits in (b) to those in (c), what is the value of raising customers' switching costs from 2 to 4?
Question 7:
You are a pricing analyst for QuantCrunch Corporation, a company that recently spent £10,000 to develop a statistical software package. To date, you only have one client. A recent internal study revealed that this client’s demand for your software is Qd = 100 – 0. 1P and that it would cost you £500 per unit to install and maintain software at this client’s site. The CEO of your company has recently asked you to:
a) Calculate the profit that results from charging this client a single per-unit price.
b) Calculate the profit that results from charging £900 for the first 10 units and £700 for each additional unit of software purchased.
c) Recommend a pricing strategy that may result in higher profits.
Question 8:
Two firms, the Alliance Company and the Bangor Corporation, produce vision systems. The demand curve for vision system is
P = 100,000 – 3(q1 + q2)
where P is the price in (pounds) of a vision system, q1 is the number of vision systems produced and sold per month by Alliance, and q2 is the number of vision systems
produced and sold per month by Bangor. Alliance’s total cost (in pounds) is TC1 = 4,000q1 .
Bangor’s total cost (in pounds) is
TC2 = 6,000q2 .
a) Suppose, as in the Cournot equilibrium, that each firm chooses its profit- maximizing level of output on the assumption that its competitor’s output is fixed. Find each firm’s “reaction function” – the rule that gives its desired output in terms of its competitor’s output.
b) Calculate the Cournot equilibrium output of each firm – the values of q1 and q2 for which both firms are doing as well as they can given their competitor’s output.
c) What are the resulting market price and profits of each firm?
(Hint: MC1 = 4,000 and MC2 = 6,000)
Question 9:
A monopolist can produce at a constant average (and marginal) cost of AC = MC = 5. The firm faces a market demand curve given by Q = 53 – P.
a) Calculate the profit-maximizing price and quantity for this monopolist. Also calculate its profits.
b) Suppose a second firm enters the market. Let q1 be the output of the first firm and q2 be the output of the second. Market demand is now given by
Q = (q1 +q2) = 53 – P.
Assuming that this second firm has the same costs as the first, write the profits of
each firm as function of q1 and q2 .
c) Suppose, as in the Cournot equilibrium, that each firm chooses its profit- maximizing level of output on the assumption that its competitor’s output is fixed. Find each firm’s “reaction curve” – the rule that gives its desired output in terms of its competitor’s output.
d) Calculate the Cournot equilibrium – the values of q1 and q2 for which both firms
are doing as well as they can given their competitor’s output.
What are the resulting market price and profits of each firm?
Question 10:
The demand function for concert tickets to be played by Jupiter symphony orchestra varies between students (S) and non-students (N). The two demand functions of the two consumer groups are given by
pN = 24 – qN and pS = 12 – qS.
At any given consumption level, non-students are willing to pay a higher price than students. Assume that the orchestra’s total cost function is C(Q) = 8+ 2Q where Q = qN + qS is the total number of tickets sold. Solve the following problems:
a) Suppose the orchestra is able to price discriminate between the two consumer groups by asking students to present their ID cards to be eligible for a student discount. Compute the profit maximizing prices pN and pS, the number of tickets sold to each group of consumers, and total monopoly profit.
b) Suppose now there are a very large number of fake student ID cards in circulation, so basically every resident has a student ID card regardless of whether the resident is a student or not. Compute the profit-maximizing price, the number of tickets sold to each group of consumers, and total profit assuming that the monopoly orchestra is unable to price discriminate.
c) By how much the orchestra enhances its profit from the introduction of student discount tickets compared with the profit generated from selling a single uniform ticket price to both consumer groups.
Question 11:
You are the manger of a local sporting goods store and recently purchased a shipment of 60 sets of skis and ski bindings at a total cost of $30,000 (your wholesale supplier would not let you purchase the skis and bindings separately, nor would it let you purchase fewer than 60 sets). The community in which your store is located consists of many different types of skiers, ranging from advanced to beginners. From experience, you know that different skiers value skis and bindings differently. However, you cannot profitably price discriminate because you cannot prevent resale. There are about 20 advanced skiers who value skies at $350 and ski bindings $250; 20 intermediate skiers who value skis at $350 and ski bindings at $375; and 20 beginning skiers who value ski at $175 and ski bindings at $325. Determine your optimal pricing strategy in detail.