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EC9410

May Examinations 2020/21

Game Theory

Section A: Answer the ONE question


1.    Suppose that each of the games below is repeated for a finite number of T > 3 periods with discount factor 6.

 

a) b)

 

 

c)

Find all subgame perfect equilibria (SPEs) of game (a). (10 marks)

Describe a strategy profile that is a SPE of game (b) if the discount factor is high      enough and which gives the players payoffs of (3,3) in all but the last 2 periods. (20 marks)

For which discount factors does the subgame perfect equilibrium explained in part b) exist?  (20 marks)


Section B: Answer ONE question

 

2.

 

Consider the juror voting game as discussed in the lecture where there is a defendant     who is guilty with probability . Each juror knows and, also each receive a private        signal about the defendant, s ∈ {g, i}, corresponding respectively to guilty and                innocent. The precision of the signal denotes the probability that a correct signal is          received; Pr(g|G) = Pr (i|G) = q where q is the precision. A defendant gets convicted if and only if all jurors vote to convict, while he gets acquitted otherwise. Each juror gets a payoff of 1 when a guilty defendant is convicted, or an innocent defendant is                 acquitted and get a payoff of 0 otherwise.

a)   Let there be 2 jurors who receive signals of precision respectively q1 and q2 . Find the conditions for a BNE in which both jurors vote to convict independently of their          signals. How does this condition change with respect to q1 and q2 ? (15 marks)

b)   Let there be 3 jurors who each receive signals of precision q. Find the conditions for a BNE in which two jurors vote truthfully (vote convict upon guilty signal and vote    acquit upon innocent signal) and one juror always votes to convict regardless of the signal. (15 marks)

c)   Let there be n jurors, each receiving a signal of precision q. Find the condition on q  for an equilibrium in which k jurors vote truthfully and n k jurors vote to convict   regardless of their signal. What happens to this condition as k increases? (20 marks)

 

3.    Consider a market in which a wholesaler (firm 0) produces a product that will be sold to  final consumers by two retailers (firms 1 and 2). The wholesaler produces the product at a constant marginal cost of c0 per unit and charges the retailers a wholesale price of pw . The retailers, after seeing pw, choose quantities qi ; the retail price is determined by the inverse demand curve pR = A b(q1 + q2).

a)    If the retailers choose their quantities simultaneously, find expressions for the equilibrium quantities as a function of the wholesale price . (12 marks)

b)    Find the subgame perfect wholesale price, the corresponding retail quantities and price and the profits of the wholesaler and the two retailers. (12 marks)

 

You may assume that A = 20; b = c0  = 2. Also, assume that retailer i has a fixed cost which is paid if (and only if) the retailer buys a positive amount of the product from the wholesaler. The fixed costs for      the two retailers are F1  = 1 and F2  = 3.5.

c)     Now suppose that the low-cost retailer chooses its quantity after observing pw and the high-cost retailer chooses its quantity after observing pw and the other               retailer’s quantity. Find the subgame perfect equilibrium quantities, wholesale and retail prices and profits. Will both retailers stay in business? (20 marks)

d)    Would the wholesaler prefer the situation in b (using A = 20; b = c0 = 2 ), the situation in c or a situation in which the wholesaler chose to pay a proportion


(which the wholesaler could determine) of the high-cost retailer’s fixed cost? (6 marks)