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MN20501 – Intermediate Accounting

January 2020 Exam – Suggested Solutions


Question 1 – compulsory

Section (a)

Nominal terms appraisal of the investment project


Year

1

2

3

4

£,000

£,000

£,000

£,000

Sales revenue

39,375

58,763

85,085

32,089

Variable cost

22,046

31,183

41,327

17,924

Contribution

17,330

27,580

43,758

14,165

Fixed costs

3,180

3,483

3,811

3,787

Cash flows before tax

14,150

24,097

39,947

10,378

Tax at 26%

3,679

6,265

10,386

2,698

TAD benefits

1,300

975

731

2,194

Cash flows after tax

11,771

18,807

30,292

9,873

Discount at 12%

0.893

0.797

0.712

0.636

Present values

10,511

14,989

21,568

6,279

£,000

Sum of PVs of future cash flows

53,347

Initial investment

20,000

NPV

33,347



Workings:


Year

1

2

3

4

Selling price (£/unit)

125

130

140

120

Inflated by 5%/year

131.25

143.33

162.07

145.86

Sales volume (units/year)

300,000

410,000

525,000

220,000

Sales revenue (£000/year)

39,375

58,763

85,085

32,089

Variable cost (£/unit)

71

71

71

71

Inflated by 3.5%/year

73.49

76.06

78.72

81.47

Sales volume (units/year)

300,000

410,000

525,000

220,000

Variable cost (£000/year)

22,046

31,183

41,327

17,924

Fixed costs (£000/year)

3,000

3,100

3,200

3,000

Inflated by 6%/year

3,180

3,483

3,811

3,787

TAD (£000)

5,000

3,750

2,813

8,438

TAD benefits (£000)

1,300

975

731

2,194


Section (b)

The achievement of stakeholder objectives by managers can be encouraged by managerial reward schemes, for example, share option schemes and performance-related pay (PRP), and by regulatory requirements, such as corporate governance codes of best practice and stock exchange listing regulations.

Share option schemes

The agency problem arises due to the separation of ownership and control, and managers pursuing their own objectives, rather than the objectives of shareholders, specifically the objective of maximising shareholder wealth. Managers can be encouraged to achieve stakeholder objectives by bringing their own objectives more in line with the objectives of stakeholders such as shareholders. This increased goal congruence can be achieved by turning the managers into shareholders through share option schemes, although the criteria by which shares are awarded need very careful consideration.

Performance-related pay

Part of the remuneration of managers can be made conditional upon their achieving specified performance targets, so that achieving these performance targets assists in achieving stakeholder objectives. Achieving a specified increase in earnings per share, for example, could be consistent with the objective of maximising shareholder wealth. Achieving a specified improvement in the quality of emissions could be consistent with a government objective of meeting international environmental targets. However, PRP performance objectives need very careful consideration if they are to be effective in encouraging managers to achieve stakeholder targets. In recent times, long-term incentive plans (LTIPs) have been accepted as more effective than PRP, especially where a company’s performance is benchmarked against that of its competitors.

Corporate governance codes of best practice

Codes of best practice have developed over time into recognised methods of encouraging managers to achieve stakeholder objectives, applying best practice to many key areas of corporate governance relating to executive remuneration, risk assessment and risk management, auditing, internal control, executive responsibility and board accountability. Codes of best practice have emphasised and supported the key role played by non-executive directors in supporting independent judgement and in following the spirit of corporate governance regulations.

Stock exchange listing regulations

These regulations seek to ensure a fair and efficient market for trading company securities such as shares and loan notes. They encourage disclosure of price-sensitive information in supporting pricing efficiency and help to decrease information asymmetry, one of the causes of the agency problem between shareholders and managers. Decreasing information asymmetry encourages managers to achieve stakeholder objectives as the quality and quantity of information available to stakeholders gives them a clearer picture of the extent to which managers are attending to their objectives.

Monitoring

One theoretical way of encouraging managers to achieve stakeholder objectives is to reduce information asymmetry by monitoring the decisions and performance of managers. One form of monitoring is auditing the financial statements of a company to confirm the quality and validity of the information provided to stakeholders.

Note: Only three ways to encourage the achievement of stakeholder objectives were required to be discussed.