BUSI 4417 (SAMPLE EXAM) Behavioral Economics and Decision Making Spring 2023
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BUSI 4417 (SAMPLE EXAM)
Spring 2023
Behavioral Economics and Decision Making
Part A
All 4 questions in this section is compulsory. The total points carried by the section is 50, with each question worth 12.5 points.
1. (12.5 points) Consider the following economic environment. There aren individuals and the income distribution is given by X = {x = (x1 , x2 , x3 ,..., xn )|x ∈ R+ }. xi denotes the income received by individual i. Let
ui (x) = xi − αi max{xj − xi , 0}
where αi > 0.
(a) Interpret the utility function. That is, describe what each part of the utility function captures.
(b) Consider the case where n = 3 and two possible income distributions x = (x1 = 6, x2 = 8, x3 = 5) and x′ = (x1 = 5, x2 = 1, x3 = 1). Which income distribution, x or x′ , would individual 1 choose, if α1 = 3/4? Explain the choice.
2. (12.5 points) Consider the following interaction between two individuals. Both individ- ual A and B has an option to choose the action C or D. If both chooses C, then each of them receive ↔4. If both chooses D, then each of them receive ↔2. If A chooses C and B chooses D, then A receives ↔0 and B receives ↔6. If A chooses D and B chooses C , then A receives ↔6 and B receives ↔0. Assume that both of them simultaneously chooses either C or D, i.e., they do not observe the other’s choice when making a decision.
(a) If A and B’s utility function over the outcome is given by
uA (xA , xB ) = xA
and
uB (xA , xB ) = xB
, what would A and B choose.
(b) If A and B’s utility function over the outcome is given by
uA (xA , xB ) = xA − max{xB − xA , 0} − max{xA − xB , 0}
and
uB (xA , xB ) = xB − max{xA − xB , 0} − max{xB − xA , 0} , what would A and B choose.
3. (12.5 points) Suppose an experimenter observes that people send positive amount of money in dictator games and concludes that individuals are driven by inequity averse preferences. Give 3 reasons why this conclusion may not be correct.
4. (12.5 points) Provide and explain 4 reasons why markets may erode moral responsibility.
Part B
Answer any one of the three questions. Each Question is worth 50 points.
1. (50 points) Charness and Dufwenberg (2006) show that promises increase trustworthy behavior and argues that the reason why promises increase trustworthy behavior is because people feel guilty if they break their promise. An alternate explanation could be that the promises are kept because people feel obligated to do so regardless of what the other person expects from the promisor. Design an experiment to test the alternate hypothesis that promises are kept because people feel obligated to do so.
2. (50 points) Consider the following experiment. The experimenter wants to test whether communication before people make contribution decision in public goods game increases contribution. The experimenter uses the following design. Groups of 3 individuals engage in the public good game with an opportunity to punish. Before the individuals decide to contribute, they can send each of their group members a message. They can either send ”I promise to contribute” or send no message. The game is repeated 10 times with the same group members. The experimenter finds that those who say ”I promise to contribute” are no more likely to cooperate than those who send no message. Argue why the conclusion that the experimenter comes to might be wrong? How would you modify the design to test whether pre-play communication affects contribution decision in Public goods game.
3. (50 points) Consider the lying aversion game proposed by Gneezy (2002). Argue why Gneezy (2002) design may not capture a pure preference for lying aversion. Design an experiment to test for lying aversion taking in account all the shortcomings you have pointed out about the Gneezy (2002) paper.
2023-08-22